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EU Enlargement: towards an uncertain future

Never before has the EU been expanded with so many countries at the same time (10), never before was the economic gap between the existing and acceding countries so large, and never before have the existing countries (EU Fifteen) been playing the role of mister  Scrooge so convincingly, and never before was the enlargement in historical terms so impressive. 

On the first of May citizens of 10 new countries will wake up to find themselves citizens of the European Union. We are talking about 71,8 million people in Central Europe, the Baltic countries (Estonia (1.4 million), Latvia (2,4 million), Lithuania (3.5 million), Poland (38,6 million), Czech Republic (10,3 million), Slovakia (5,4 million), Hungary (10.2 million),  a relatively unproblematic Balkan country like Slovenia (2 million) and relatively rich Malta (0,4 million) and Southern part of  Cyprus (0.7 million). Bulgaria and Romania will follow in 2007. And in the years thereafter there is a queue of other hopefuls including Croatia, Turkey, Albania, Bosnia, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro. There are even commentators mentioning the names of Moldova, Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, Russia, Palestine state, Israel, Morocco

The following questions come to mind:
1. what is the historical background of the Big Bang?
2. How wide is the economic gap between Fifteen and the Ten?
3. Has the West been generous? No
5. What will widening bring? Revisiting history: will Europe after the Cold War  go back to its normal path of disunity?
6. Will enlargement consolidate democracies in the East?
7. Will widening preclude deepening?
8. Will widening make Europe more Atlanticist?

The historical importance of the Big Bang

There is no doubt that Central Europa was a vital part of Europe from the 16th century until the iron curtain after 1945 separated so many families and split cultures that had  always belong together. Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart celebrated his greatest triumphs in the Opera houses in Prague. Many of his premiers were set to stage there and not in Vienna. And what about Napoleon and his love affair with Maria Walewska a Polish noble women who even bore him a son in 1810, or George Sand with Chopin, or Pierre and Marie Curie.
  What makes the artificial separation of the West and the East so tragic is the simple fact that history could have had a much happier course if Roosevelt would have been willing to listen to Churchill. During the War Churchill consistently tried to obtain the support of Roosevelt in waging the second front war in Italy and therefore enabling the Allied Armies to enter as quickly as possible the Balkans and liberate as much as possible territory in Eastern Europe before the red army would arrive there since Stalin would never be prepared to levae that territory by free will. Unfortunately Roosevelt trusted Stalin, whoe he called him Uncle Joe, and he also needed his support in the War with the Japan and for the creation of the United Nations. Consequently, the people living in Eastern Europe had to pay the price for the stability that the West has enjoyed during the Cold War. Obviously, in Postdam and Yalta the betrayal became complete. 
  Seen from this historical perspective, one would be forgiven to think that the existing 15 EU countries would be more than generous in helping the 10 acceding poor countries out. This because the 10 acceding countries are indeed very poor.


The economic gap EU 15 and acceding 10

Lessons of earlier enlargements
Ireland 1973 62 % GDP per capita of EU total in 2002 increased 121 %
Greece 1981 64 % GDP per capita of EU total in 2002 increased 70 %
1986 Spain 72,5 % GDP per capita of EU total in 2000 increased 81 %
1986 Portugal 52 % GDP per capita of Eu total in 2000 increased 74 %

Big Bang 10 countries have average of 22% GDP per capita of EU 15

EU 15 378 million citizens, 10 acceding countries 75 million people, their combined GDP 840 billion dollars, comparable to size of Spain, EU 15 has 9570 billion dollars, The Ten are 8,7 % of total EU GDP (15), population of Ten is 20 % of total population of EU Fifteen


Even Scrooge would be impressed: Enlargement comes cheap


CAP subsidies will be limited to 25% of those paid in the West
No income support
Structural payments would hew (zich houden aan) tot the 4 % GDP rule
Payments would total 40,1 billion euros (for ten rather than 6 entrants)
Structural payments would be limited to 114 euros per capita (Club Med gets 231 per capita)
Total package equals an estimated net 0.05 % of the EU GDP annually, or 3 billion euros of the 6 trillion EU economy
Per Capita Marshall Aid was 15 times as great in real terms.

The negotiations process has indeed been harrowing. The French refused to commit to an accession date and wanted the CAP to be treated as sacrosanct and feared future German domination and hinted therfore that indefinite postponement of enlargement would not make them unhappy.
  Schroder and Stoiber both tried to capture the anti-imigrant vote by outdoing each other in lambasting obfuscating Eurocrats, refusing to pay more into the EU and promising to restrict the free movement of labour. As it happens they succeeded in postponing it 7 years. When France and Germany decided to close their borders for 7 years. The other had no other choice than to follow.

Chirac-Schroder deal 24 October 2002 is really the limit:

French have won the Enlargement endgame:
Standstill agreement that eliminates any opportunity for reform:
Nothing will be done prior to 2007 to reduce the 50 % of the Community budget that CAP consumes
The five year guarantee to Western European framers will leave little for the accession countries and give unfair competitive advantage to the rich farmers of the West over the poor ones of the East.
The deal also leaves in place a gradual phase in of the support payments with increases from 25 % in 2004 in 5 percent increments until reaching 40 % by 2006-2007
Thereafter CAP can rise only a single percent annually until 2013 by which time the rates paid the new memebrs will have been brought to parity with the level of the original 15. Even then, the accession states will be able to claim only a tiny fraction of the largesse
By 2006 2.5 billioneuros would accrue to the accessions states as opposed to about  43 billion euros to the farmers of the Fifteen. By 2013 this share of the 10 accession states can grow to 5 billion which does not, however, mean a reduction of subsidies for the present members.
Scrooge could not have done it better, The 24 Oktober deal is the greatest coup in the history of European Integration. Chirac brought halt to a decade of effort to reform the CAP. It is utterly idenfensible. Harm done in Eastern Europe, Bad for the Third World, stimulates overproduction, bad for the consumers and bad for the net contributors.

Apart from furious farmers in the East what will this enlargement bring? To answer this we have to know how the actual engine of integration since 1951 really functioned.

History of European Integration; ever closer union?

This answer can only be answered if we know what Europe actually represents and iw we try to discover what the inner motivations have been of the fouding fathers of the EU. 
Whig interpretation of British history: inexorable progress towards more freedom. Herbert Butterfield applied to Europe: European history is interpreted as a story of progress towards more freedom, democracy, more integration and in the end more unity. Continental idealistic teleological reading of recent European history. Needs English empirical critique.
  What is Europe? Toynbee said: not an intelligible field of historical study. The ancient history of Greece and Rome and modern Western history are not successive acts in a single European drama. But even in the European age, the continent’s Eastern border remained deeply ill-defined. Was it the Elbe? Or the dividing line between Western and Eastern Christianity? Or the Urals? There is simply no agreement on this issue.
  No continent is externally more ill-defined, internally more diverse or historically more disorrderly than Europe. Yet Europe has produced schemes for its own unification. Duc de Sully, Briand, Coudenhove –Kalergi. Peaceful designs, hoever, were never implemented and those that were implemented were not peaceful (Napoleon, Hitler). And the latter failed too.
  Thus the attempt at European unification since 1945 stands out from all earlier attempts by being both peaceful and implemented and thus far successful. Hence, the idealitistic interpretation would be that Europa has finally learend its lesson from history. The European civil war of 1914 until 1945 has finally brought us to our senses.
  Is this interpretation correct? Peaceful applies only to the continent wets of the iron curtain. In the East there was 1956, 1968 and Poland 1981/1982. Hence, the Cold War played a crucial role in stimulating integration. SU as a negative external integrator and the USA as a positive external integrator. The Iron curtian also enabled the Europe of the Six to strat with a small number of states , all democarcies and at a roughly comparable economic level and with important older elements of common history. Charlemagnes Holy Roman Empire. That balance changed with the accession of Spain, Portugal (1986) and Greece but by that time the exuisting states seemed rich enough to carry them.
  The founders of the Europe of the Six were not federalists. People like Jean Monnet or Kohnstamm simply lost the battle. The founders were hard nosed realistst that above all wanted to solve national problems and therefore strengthened the nation state by integrating instead of undermining it. The crucial trade offs were between France and Germany. Between French iron and German coal, between French agriulture and German industry. Between the French desire to use Europe as a vehicle to promote national grandeur and Germany’s interest in international rehabiluitation after Nazism.
  Real idealism came later with people like Helmut Kohl who indeed had been overwhelmed by the lifting of the first bordercontrols between France and Germany a few years after the war. He hoped that integration would result in German unification. And when it worked out that way he felt that Germany had to tie his hands in the framework of EMU in order to reassure the rest of Europe. Hence Kohl did not trust his fellow countrymen, a theme that is running through 19th and 20thcentury foreign policy thinking. 
  Besides this mixture of genuinely idealistic and national motives there was undoubtedly a growing perception of real common interests. In a world dominated by superpowers the countries of Europe could be more powerful if they would speak with one voice.
  This dynamic European process contributed directly to the end of the Cold War. Gorbachev worried that SU would be left behind and excluded from a Europe that was integrating behind a protectionist wall.
  How much more was this true of the peoples of Eastern Europe. Who felt to belong historically and culturally to Europe and saw it as a better alternative to a discredited and stagnant real socialism. One of the great slogans to arise from the velvet revolutions in 1989 in Central Europe was the return to Europe. It lookes as the Whig interpretation was right: Europe was becoming Europe.
  Yet as so often the moment of triumph was also the beginning of a crisis. Western-Europe invented all kind of problems to prevent the East from entering the EU. What about the CSCE or the Council of Europe. Mitterrand talked about a European Confederation. Anything except opening the door to the EU. Measured against the magnitude of the historic change in Europe, however, or by the standard of what West Germany has done for East Germany, the so-called Europe agreements of the nineties were tardy (dralend) and paltry (onbeduidend).
  This is not just because The EU is a a lsow-moving protectionist community. Nor is it only because France fears that enlargement will shift the centre of gravity to the East in the interest of Germany. Nor is it only because Spain, Portugal, Greece and Italy worry about the loss of financial transfers from the Union budget that would now go to the newcomers. It was also because France and Germany felt that economic and monetary union  should be the response to the end of the Cold War. Kohl finds Germany too big for Europe and to small for the world and therefore want to bind a united Germany irreversibly into Europe. German citizens were only willing to surrender the Deutschmark when European monetary union would adopt the same monetary rigour and fiscal discipline. We now know that those assurances were clearly wrong. The growth and stability pact is dead and buried.
  So there were clear criteria and timetables for monetary union but there were neither for the eastward enlargement. Subsequently there was widespread disillusionment with Europe in the East.
  People began to reopen the discussions on the Whig interpretation of Europe. Perhaps it was not the EC but NATO that had kept the peace. And perhaps it was not Europe’s unity but Europe’s division that had prevented the outbreak of war. After all, European diversity had most of the time Europe transformed in a battlefield.  In the Balkans it was all happening again. The disjuncture between West European rhetoric and East European reality became grotesque. War has become unthinkable said the politicians in Brussels and Sarajevo was bombed into the Middle Ages.
  So, will Europe go back tot its normal pre-war pattern of disunity or will it continue its peaceful path to an ever closer union. Timothy Garton Ash does not believe that the return is inevitable but he refuses in 1996 to accept the choice monetary union or war. European unification is not a primary end in itself but a means of securing peace, freedom and democracy. Will it work that way?

Will enlargement consolidate democracies in the East?

The EU is still a fragile thing. It has never won the hearts and minds of all its citizens. The vast majority of its citizens still identify obstinately with their nation states. Nor does the EU have much coherence as a political project, now that it has abandoned supranationalism as its final goal without substituting anything else. Moreover, many citizens of the 10 acceding countries feel betrayed by the outcome of the lonwinded negotiations. Lately, Eastern Europe has seen a revival of old populist voices. Meciar in Slovakia for instance. Some of them can hardly be called democratic. 
  Moreover, the way EU operates with deals behind closed doors will multiply disagreements and misunderstandings. And when the newcomers will join EMU in about 5 to 7 years they will also become part of an experiment in monetary cooperation of which nobody knows that it can stand the test of assymetric economic shocks. 
  And there is another gloomy consideration. Nation building in Eastern Europe has always been troublesome because there are so many ethnic minorities. The Czech Republic has the socalled Sudeten Germans. Hungary has ties with ethnic minorities in Serbia and Ukraine. So, Hungary prefers an open border with Ukraine something the Fifteen definitely do not want. Slovakia has a Hungarian minority and tense relations with Hungary. And when Serbia will join: In the North of Serbia there is the Vojvodina. Here live Serbs, Hungarians, Slovaks, Ruthenians, Rumanians, Romanies, Macedonians There are many more examples.
  Will enlargements consolidate the democracies in the East?. It worked that way in Spain. Portugal and Greece. Although in Greece things have been quite messy at times. It is not at all certain that it will also work in the East:
1. The east is much poorer than Greece, Spain, Portugal
2. a whole generation has never experienced freedom and therefore responsibility. In Franco Spain there was at least some free market thinking around.
3. The integration of Eastern Germany took much longer than everybody thought
4. there is always the option of evolution in the direction of an illiberal democracy (Zakaria)

The EU Draft constitution creates possibility of secession. It seems wise also to create the possibility to excommunicate a country. Without it the Fifteen will lack the leverage to promote democracy in the new countries after the actual accession. 
Will enlargement preclude deepening?


Will enlargement preclude deepening?

1. the big bang countries just restored their sovereignty after the communist era they do not desire to loose it again and hand it over to Brussels 
2. The new members will joint the economic liberals among the member states such as Ireland, UK, the Netherlands and Sweden. These countries will form a majority that fiercely opposes any harmonisation of tax rates in the EU. That is a good thing in itself because policy competition in the area of taxation is better than harmonization. Recent research shows that there is no race to the bottom
3. The new members will speak out against a social Europe since lower wages and social protection are the only instrument they have that enables them to compete with the Fifteen. That is also a good thing because policy competition keeps everybody fit.
4. the newcomers are not federalists but with the exception of Poland all of them are keen to prevent the dominance of the largets nations. Intergovernmental bargaining disadvantages small states. So the future of the European Commission is not that bad as is often portrayed.
5. the Central and East Europeans are keen for the EU to become regional power. They will push the Union to let the Balkans join and to give more help to its neighbours to the East
6. When the new members will join EMU within 7 to 12 years years they will feel the need of a new effective version of the growth and stability pact. Either more coordination or more tension. It seems unlikely that marketintegration and policy competition will be sufficient to keep monetary integration on track. 
7. decisionmaking in a EU of 25 or 27 will be arduously difficult. This will create pressure for new more effective forms of decision making. At the same time the big bang countries will try to keep their loss of sovereignty at a minimum

Will enlargement make EU more Atlantic?
 
President Chiracs outburst  in February 2003 when he said that the central Europeans should have shut up instead of supporting the USA policy on Iraq betrayed just the patronising and bullying attitude which the EU new members least want to encounter from Brussels. Forewarned by Chirac, they will enter the EU in a more combative mood, complicating their future relations with France and when Germany does not move also with Germany. The new members are by and large pro-American and pro-Nato. Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary (1999) and the Baltic countries (2004) are already a NATO member (2004)(together with Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania, Bulgaria) Albania, Croatia and Macedonia have already Nato observer status. Turkey is already a member. Sweden,Finland Austria have partner status.
  Unless the Anglo-American position in Iraq will become dishonorouble EU enlargement will make the EU more atlanticist and therefore will make it even more difficult to establish a common European foreign policy.
  At the same time, however, there has been a consensus between France, Germany and UK that EU should have a limited military planning capability provided that the Americans would not feel offended. Eu has now its own EU military planning cell and is active in Macedonia (April 2003) in Congo (2003) and Bosnia (taking over NATO peace keeping mission 2004)

Will it work? The problem is that these three countries if they succeed will aggravate the tensions between the small powers and the larger ones and when they fail only demonstrate the inherent divisiveness and therefore weakness of the EU. At the end of the day, therefore, Europe cannot speak with one voice and unity can only be attained in an Atlantic framework. NATO remains crucial.

Will EU ever include Turkey?

Turkey is an old NATO member. And it is a strong ally in the War on terror. The Americans troops had to be redirected from the Turkish harbours through the Suez channel but even than the secular model of the Turkish state is still extremely important as a role model for the Middle East. Turkey has also the famous oilpipeline from Baku (Caspian sea) to the Mediterranean sea. These are strong points in the new geopolitical game. 
Moreover the behaviour of the Greek Cypriots has increased the leverage of Erdogan and Turkey. Accession would be seen as a very positive sign by the millions of muslims living in the Fifteen. At the same time the 2.7 million Turks coming to the West will put further pressure on the multicultural society.  It is not inconceivable that Turkey will be a member from 2015 or 2020 onwards. If that were to happen the following points are very important:
1. France should not be allowed to repeat its October 2002 trick of refusing to reform the CAP and keeping all the agricultural subsidies for itself
2. If the EU puts pressure on Turkey to reform its army it should realize that by doing that it eliminates the traditional countervailing force against Islam.
3. Turky must improve its econo9mic institutions (independent central bank and the abolition of its semi-autonomou decentralized budget authorities) 
4. Turkey must improve its human rights record and not only by law but also by monitoring the implementation of the law




From a historical perspective the big bang enlargement is quite impressive. The fact that negotiations were so arduous and long winded and the frugality of the West spoils at least part of the grandeur of the historical moment.
Widening will make the EU more atlanticist, less interested in deepening social integration. These are good things in themselves. Widening refrains the EU from developing in unwanted directions like dreaming about an impossible common forerign policy and socially detrimental elements of social integration.

At the same  time, the forthcoming EMU membership makes it very difficult to make predictions. One thing, however, is certain: a single currency in a zone of countries with widely diverging economic starting[positions as well as economic policies will be quite tough to manage. It seems quite conceivable that some countries will decide to opt out or even drop out. One thing is for sure: Europe is in for a rough ride. It may very well be that the years of deepening are gone at least for some time to come.

